ABSTRACT. We introduce an analog of the theory of Borel equivalence relations in which we study equivalence relations that are decidable by an infinite time Turing machine. The Borel reductions are replaced by the more general class of infinite time computable functions. Many basic aspects of the classical theory remain intact, with the added bonus that it becomes sensible to study some special equivalence relations whose complexity is beyond Borel or even analytic. We also introduce an infinite time generalization of the countable Borel equivalence relations, a key subclass of the Borel equivalence relations, and again show that several key properties carry over to the larger class. Lastly, we collect together several results from the literature regarding Borel reducibility which apply also to absolutely ∆ 1 2 reductions, and hence to the infinite time computable reductions.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of Borel equivalence relation theory-by now a highly developed, successful enterprise-begins with the observation (see Friedman-Stanley [FS] and HjorthKechris [HK] ) that many classification problems arising naturally in mathematics can be regarded as relations, often Borel relations, on a standard Borel space. For example, since groups are determined by their multiplication functions, the isomorphism relation on countable groups can be regarded as a relation on the subspace of 2 ω×ω×ω corresponding to the graphs of such functions. This isomorphism relation is properly analytic, but its restriction to finitely generated groups is Borel. The subject aims to understand these and many other relations by placing them into a hierarchy of relative complexity measured by Borel reducibility. Specifically, an equivalence relation E on a Borel space is Borel reducible to another, F, if there is a Borel function f such that x E y ⇐⇒ f (x) F f (y) for all x, y in the underlying space. In this case, we write E ≤ B F, and we think of this reducibility as asserting that F at least as complex as E. Indeed, the function [x] E → [ f (x)] F is an explicit classification of the E-equivalence classes using F-equivalence classes. More generally, composition with f gives an explicit method of turning any F-invariant classification into an E-invariant classification, and in this sense, the classification problem for F is at least as hard as the classification problem for E.
In this article, a small project, we aim to extend the analysis from the Borel context to a larger context of effectivity. Namely, we shall consider the context of infinite time computability, a realm properly between Borel and ∆ 1 2 . Specifically, we shall enlarge the reducibility concept by allowing infinite time computable reduction functions (a class of functions we review in Section 2). This is sensible for several reasons. First, the class of infinite time computable functions properly extends the class of Borel functions-a function is Borel exactly when it is infinite time computable in uniformly bounded countable ordinal time-while retaining much of the effective flavor and content of the Borel context. The infinite time computable functions, determined by the operation of a finite Turing machine program computing in transfinite ordinal time, seem in many ways as "explicit" as the Borel functions are sometimes described to be, but they reach much higher into the descriptive set-theoretic hierarchy, well into the class ∆ 1 2 . Second, meanwhile, many natural equivalence relations that lay outside the Borel boundary, particularly those having to do with well-orders or with more arbitrary isomorphism relations for countable structures, are captured within the bounds of infinite time computability. For example, it is infinite time computable, but not Borel, to decide whether a given real codes a well order, and the corresponding order isomorphism relation on countable well orders is infinite time computable, but not Borel. More generally, the isomorphism relation for arbitrary countable structures in arbitrary countable languages is also infinite time computable, but not Borel. Third, it will turn out that much (but not all) of the Borel theory carries over to our enlarged context, at least for many of the relations studied by that theory. Positive instances of Borel reducibility, of course, carry over directly because Borel functions are infinite time computable. Conversely, a deep aspect of the Borel theory is that many of the proofs of non-reducibility, that is, instances of equivalence relations E and F for which E ≤ B F, actually overshoot the Borel context by showing, for example, that there are no measurable reduction functions for a given pair of equivalence relations; since infinite time computable functions are measurable, these arguments also rule out reducibilities in our context. The point is that such non-reduction arguments lay at the center of the Borel theory, and the overshooting phenomenon means that in these instances, the nonreduction results transfer largely intact to the infinite time computable context. Thus, in our project we explore the limits of this phenomenon. In summary, we propose to study the hierarchy of equivalence relations under the concepts of reducibility provided by infinite time computability.
In contrast, recent work of Knight [KMVB] and others aim far in the other direction, by restricting the notion of reducibility from Borel functions down to the class of (ordinary) Turing computable functions. Since this is a very restrictive notion of reduction, it allowed them to separate many complexity classes more finely and to analyze even classes of finite structures. Our work here can be seen as complementary to theirs, since we consider comparatively generous notions of reducibility.
This paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we shall describe in detail the infinite time Turing machines, the class of sets which they decide, and the class of functions which they compute. In fact, we shall define several distinct ways in which these machines can accept their input, leading to distinct but closely related notions of effectivity. In the third section, we give some basic facts about Borel equivalence relations and Borel reductions, and compare this situation with the case of infinite time computable equivalence relations and functions. In the fourth section, we consider the special case of countable Borel equivalence relations (i.e., those with countable classes). We define the class of infinite time enumerable equivalence relations, which is a natural generalization of the class of countable Borel equivalence relations to the infinite time context. In the last section, we give a survey of methods of demonstrating non-reducibility results in the case of absolutely ∆ 1 2 reductions. We use these methods to determine the relationships between the infinite time computable equivalence relations discussed in this paper, and these relationships are summarized in Figure 3 at the conclusion of the paper.
THE INFINITE TIME COMPLEXITY CLASSES
Infinite time Turing machines, introduced in [HL2] , generalize the operation of ordinary Turing machines into transfinite ordinal time. An infinite time Turing machine has three one-way infinite tapes (the input tape, the work tape and the output tape), each with ω many cells exhibiting either 0 or 1, and computes according to a finite program with finitely many states. Successor stages of computation proceed in exactly the classical manner, with the machine reading from and writing to the tape and moving the head left or right according to the program instructions for the current state. At limit time stages, the configuration of the machine is determined by placing the head on the left-most cell, setting the state to a special "Limit" state, and updating each cell of the tape with the lim sup of the previous values exhibited by that cell (which is the limit value, if the value had stabilized, otherwise 1). Computation stops only when the "Halt" state is explicitly attained, and in this case, the machines outputs the contents of the output tape. Since the input and output tapes naturally accommodate infinite binary sequences, that is, elements of Cantor space 2 ω , the machines provide infinitary notions of computability and decidability on Cantor space. The machines can be augmented with additional input tapes to accommodate real parameters or oracles. We denote by ϕ z e (x) the output of program e on input x with parameter z, if this computation halts; if it doesn't halt, then ϕ z e (x) is undefined, or diverges. A partial function f . : 2 ω → 2 ω is infinite time computable if there exists e and z such that f = ϕ z e . For a program e operating on a machine without a parameter tape, we denote the output as ϕ e (x), and say that the corresponding function ϕ e is infinite time computable without parameters.
A simple cofinality argument ([HL2, Theorem 1.1]) shows that if an infinite time computation halts, then it does so in a countable ordinal number of steps. And if a computation does not halt, then it is necessarily due to the fact that it is caught in an infinite loop, in the strong sense that at limits of repetitions of this loop, the computation remains inside the loop. (Looping phenomenon in ordinal time is complicated by the curious fact that an infinite time computation can exactly repeat a configuration, looping ω many times, but nevertheless escape the loop at the limit of these repetitions.)
A subset A ⊂ 2 ω is infinite time decidable if its characteristic function is infinite time computable, and infinite time semidecidable if it is the domain of an infinite time computable function. These concepts naturally extend to subsets of (2 ω ) n for n ≤ ω, by the use of canonical pairing functions (or by using extra input tapes). We warn the reader that a function can have an infinite time decidable graph, as a subset of the plane, without being an infinite time computable function (see [HL2, Lost Melody theorem 4.9] ). The reason has to do with the inability of the infinite time machines to search entirely through Cantor space in a computable manner, and so the analogue of the classical algorithm showing this doesn't happen for finite-time computations on ω simply does not work here. We say that a function f is infinite time semicomputable if the graph of f is infinite time decidable. Thus, every every infinite time computable function is infinite time semicomputable, but not generally conversely.
We let D denote the class of infinite time decidable subsets of 2 ω . Since we have allowed a real parameter z in the definition of an infinite time decidable set, the class D fits naturally into the bold-face descriptive set theory context. Similarly, let sD denote the class of semidecidable subsets of 2 ω , and sD the class of co-semidecidable subsets of 2 ω . The classes of infinite time decidable sets and functions subsume the corresponding Borel classes. In fact, we have the following remarkable characterization. Thus, Borel effectivity is the entry into the larger hierarchy of computability provided by infinite time Turing machines. Before the proof, let us fix the notation ω 1,ck for the supremum of the ordinals that are computable by a classical Turing machine. If z ∈ 2 ω , then let ω z 1,ck denote the relativized version, the supremum of the ordinals that are computable by a classical Turing machine with oracle parameter z. The ordinal ω z 1,ck is known to be the least ordinal which is admissible in the parameter z. The proof of Theorem 2.1 is then an easy consequence of [HL2, Theorem 2.7] , which states that A is ∆ 1 1 if and only if it can be decided by a program which halts uniformly in fewer than ω 1,ck steps.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. To establish the first statement, we need only observe that the proof of [HL2, Theorem 2.7] relativizes to show that a set A is ∆ 1 1 (z) if and only if it can be decided by a program which halts uniformly in fewer than ω z 1,ck steps. This implies directly that every Borel set is infinite time decidable in uniformly bounded time. Conversely, if A is infinite time decidable from parameter z in time uniformly bounded by α, then simply augment z with a real y coding α, so that α < ω z⊕y 1,ck , and conclude that A ∈ ∆ 1 1 (z ⊕ y) and therefore A is Borel.
For the second statement, suppose that f is infinite time computable uniformly in some number of steps which is bounded below ω 1 . It follows that the graph of f is infinite time decidable in some bounded number of steps, and therefore, by the first paragraph, the graph of f is Borel. Conversely, if f is a Borel function, then for each n, the set
is Borel, and hence it is infinite time decidable by a program which halts uniformly in fewer than α n steps. It follows that f (x) is infinite time decidable by a program which halts uniformly in fewer than sup(α n ) + ω steps.
In the following proposition, Abs ∆ 
1 sets are infinite time decidable follows from the fact that an infinite time Turing machine can detect whether a given relation is wellfounded (see [HL2, CountThrough Theorem] Note that the inclusions in Proposition 2.2 are proper (except, consistently, the last), since by the classical diagonalization argument the halting set H := {(x, p) : p halts on input x} is infinite time semidecidable but not infinite time decidable. It follows that the complement R × ω H is a set which is absolutely ∆ 1 2 but not semidecidable. It follows that the function which maps each x ∈ 2 ω to its infinite time (light-face) jump
is not infinite time computable. Although one might expect that the jump function is semicomputable, we shall see shortly that this is not the case. However, there is a program which eventually writes the jump, in the sense that on input x the program will write x ▽ on the output tape and never change it after some ordinal stage. Indeed, consider the "universal" program which simulates all programs simultaneously on the input x. Each time one of the simulated programs halts, the master program adds a code for that program to a list on the output tape. Since each halting program will do so in countably many steps, the output tape will eventually converge to a code for x ▽ . We are thus led to study the following broader classes of infinite time effective sets and functions.
2.3. Definition.
• A partial function f . : 2 ω → 2 ω is infinite time eventually computable if there exists a program e such that on any input x ∈ dom( f ), the computation of e on x has the feature that from some ordinal time onward, the output tape exhibits the value f (x), and for x / ∈ dom( f ), the output tape does not eventually stabilize in this way.
• Proof. Suppose that A is semidecidable and let e be a program which halts if and only if x ∈ A. Let q be the program which initially writes 0, and then simulates e, changing its output to 1 whenever e halts. Then q converges to 1 if e halts and to 0 if e does not, and so A is infinite time eventually decidable. To see that every infinite time semieventually decidable set is absolutely ∆ 1 2 , use the same argument as Proposition 2.2, but replace the halting notion of acceptance with eventual convergence, which is observable in the settled snapshot sequences. To see that the inclusions are proper, consider the following analog of the halting set. Namely, let S denote the "stabilizing" set {(x, p) : p stabilizes on input x}. Then S is easily seen to be infinite time semieventually decidable but not infinite time eventually decidable. It follows that S c is absolutely ∆ 1 2 but not infinite time semieventually decidable. Finally, suppose that both A and A c are sE. Let e be a program which eventually stabilizes if and only if the input x ∈ A and let q be a program which eventually stabilizes if and only if x ∈ A. Then consider the program r which simulates both e and q, writing 1 whenever q changes its output, and writing 0 whenever e changes its output. r does not change its output until either of these events occurs. Clearly, r will eventually write 1 if and only if x ∈ A and it will eventually write 0 if and only if x ∈ A.
The relationship between the the corresponding classes of functions is slightly different.
Proposition. A function f is infinite time computable if and only if it is both infinite time eventually computable and infinite time semicomputable.
It follows that the jump function x → x ▽ is indeed not semicomputable.
Proof. If f is infinite time eventually computable by program e and semicomputable by program q, then it can be computed by the program which simulates e, at each step using q to check to see if the value on the output tape for e is correct.
We have already observed that even the infinite time semieventually decidable sets lie within the class of absolutely ∆ 1 2 sets. When it comes to functions, the absolutely ∆ 1 2 property only extends to the infinite time eventually computable functions. Here, a function f is said to be absolutely ∆ 1 2 if and only if its diagram
Not every function with an infinite time decidable graph will be absolutely ∆ 1 2 in this sense, and indeed by Theorem 3.7 in the next section, not every semicomputable function is absolutely ∆ Proof. Let f be a function which is infinite time eventually computable using the program p, and (x, s) be given. We can eventually decide whether s ⊂ f (x) by simulating p on input x and checking at each stage whether s is contained in the output.
Corollary. Every infinite time eventually decidable set is measurable. Every infinite time eventually computable function is a measurable function.
When we speak of measure, we are of course referring to the natural coin-flipping probability measure on 2 ω , also called the Lebesgue or Haar measure. It is just the ω-fold product of the ( 1 2 , 1 2 ) measure on {0, 1} The following result will be of fundamental importance in later sections.
Proof. By [Kan, Exercise 14.4 ] every absolutely ∆ 1 2 set is measurable, and hence every infinite time eventually decidable set is measurable. If f is an infinite time eventually computable function, it follows from Theorem 2.6 that for every open U ⊂ 2 ω , f −1 (U) is absolutely ∆ 1 2 . Hence f −1 (U) is measurable, and so f is measurable.
INFINITE TIME EFFECTIVE REDUCTIONS
We are now ready to begin our generalization of Borel reducibility to the infinite time computability context. We shall introduce several classical results of Borel equivalence relation theory in turn and inquire how they are transferred or transformed to the infinite time computability context. And we shall also introduce several of the natural equivalence relations that we aim to fit into our new hierarchy. In the following section, we will begin to treat the infinite time analogue of the countable Borel equivalence relations.
Recall that if E, F are equivalence relations on 2 ω , then f is a reduction from E to F if and only if it satisfies
We say that E is Borel reducible to F, written E ≤ B F, if there is a Borel reduction from E to F. We propose to focus on the following generalizations of the reduction concept to the context of infinite time computability, corresponding to the two notions of computability that we have discussed.
• The relation E is infinite time computably reducible to F, written E ≤ c F, if there is an infinite time computable reduction from E to F.
• The relation E is infinite time eventually reducible to F, written E ≤ e F, if there is an infinite time eventually computable reduction from E to F.
To begin with some elementary considerations from the Borel theory, let ∆(1), ∆(2), . . ., ∆(ω) denote arbitrary but fixed Borel equivalence relations with 1, 2, . . . , ω classes, respectively. Then ∆(1) < B ∆(2) < B · · · < B ∆(ω), and moreover these are the simplest relations in the sense that for any E with infinitely many classes, ∆(ω) ≤ B E. The next least complex Borel equivalence relation is the equality relation on 2 ω , sometimes denoted ∆(2 ω ) or simply =.
3.1. Theorem (Silver dichotomy). If E is a Borel (or even Π 1 1 ) equivalence relation then either E has at most countably many classes or else = ≤ B E.
Equivalence relations E which are Borel reducible to = are called smooth or completely classifiable, since the corresponding reduction function shows how to concretely compute complete invariants for E. One step further up the hierarchy, one finds the almost equality relation E 0 , which is defined by x E 0 y if and only if x(n) = y(n) for almost all n.
We now present a proof that E 0 is not Borel reducible to =. This will be the first example of a proof that there cannot be a Borel reduction from E to F which overshoots and shows more. In this case, it shows that there cannot be a measurable reduction from E to F, and hence there cannot be an infinite time decidable or even provably ∆ 1 2 such reduction. We shall discuss this phenomenon further int he last section.
Proposition.
There is no measurable reduction from E 0 to equality =, and hence = < c E 0 .
Proof. Suppose that f is a measurable reduction from E 0 to =. Then for every U ⊂ 2 ω , f −1 (U) is closed under E 0 equivalence, i.e. it is closed under finite modifications. Such a set is called a "tail set", and a direct argument shows that such sets have measure 0 or 1. Letting U run over the basic sets, we obtain that f is constant on a set of measure 1. But f is countable-to-one, and since the measure is nonatomic, this is a contradiction.
We presently discuss a second dichotomy theorem (see [HKL] ).
Theorem (Glimm-Effros dichotomy). If E is any Borel equivalence relation then either E is smooth or else E 0 ≤ B E.
Neither the Silver dichotomy nor the Glimm-Effros dichotomy can hold in the case of infinite time decidable equivalence relations and infinite time computable reductions for the simple reason that there exist infinite time computable equivalence relations which necessarily have ℵ 1 many classes. But it is conceivable that this is the only obstruction, and many questions about E 0 and infinite time computable equivalence relations remain open.
3.4. Question. Do any useful generalizations of the Silver dichotomy or Glimm-Effros dichotomy hold in the case of infinite time decidable equivalence relations and infinite time computable reductions? One might ask if there is any difference whatsoever between the Borel and infinite time computable theories. Of course not every infinite time computable reduction can be replaced by a Borel reduction. To give a trivial counterexample, consider an infinite time decidable equivalence relation E with just two non-Borel classes: clearly, in this case we have E ≤ c ∆(2) and E ≤ B ∆(2). Of course, such counterexamples must be pervasive in the hierarchy, for instance by replacing one of those equivalences classes with another entire equivalence relation. In Proposition 3.6 we shall give a naturally occurring pair of equivalence relations such that E ≤ c F and E ≤ B F. However, our example will be of high descriptive complexity, and so we are left with the following interesting problem.
For an example of such E and F of higher complexity, we consider the following two equivalence relations.
• Let x ∼ = WO y if and only if x and y, thought of as codes for binary relations on ω, code isomorphic wellorders on ω. Proof. Results in [HL2] show that for any real x, the ordinal ω x 1,ck is infinite time writable from parameter x, and this algorithm is uniform in x. So there is an infinite time computable function f such that f (x) is a real coding the ordinal ω x 1,ck . This function is therefore a reduction from E ck to ∼ = WO . Next, we shall show there can be no Borel reduction f from E ck to ∼ = WO . Suppose that f is such a reduction. It takes values in WO and since E ck has ω 1 many equivalence classes, the range of f must code unboundedly many ordinals. By the boundedness theorem (see [Kec, Theorem 35 .23]), im( f ) is not Σ 1 1 and hence f is not Borel.
Next we show that ∼ = WO reduces to E ck . Let y be a code for an ordinal α. We shall compute x = f (y) depending only on α and such that ω x 1 is equal to the α th admissible ordinal δ. First, given a code z for an ordinal β we can always find its admissible successor (the least admissible above β). To see this, note that it must be bounded by ω z 1,ck . So for each β < γ ≤ ω z 1,ck we simply build L γ and check to see that it satisfies the KP axioms. Now we can iterate this α times to find the α th admissible ordinal δ. Next build L δ , and search inside it to find the L-least x such that ω x 1,ck = δ. Clearly x depends only on α and not the given code y.
Finally, we argue that no such reduction f can be Borel. Indeed, notice that E ck is a Σ 
Proof. Following the L-code argument of [HMSW, Theorem 38] , given x ∈ 2 ω we shall encode its equivalence class by a pair of reals. Let α < ω 1 be least such that L α contains a member of the E-equivalence class of x, and L α |= "some (fixed) large fragment of ZFC and ω 1 exists." The idea is that L α is large enough that all computations on reals of L α halt or repeat in fewer than α steps.
Let β > α be least such that β is countable in L β+1 and let w ∈ L β+1 be the L-least real coding β. Finally let z be the L-least real which is E-equivalent to x. Then by our choice of α, we have z ∈ L α . Now, f (x) := w ⊕ z is the code we seek.
We clearly have x E y if and only if f (x) = f (y), but we must verify that f is infinite time semicomputable. That is, a machine must recognize given (x, w 0 ⊕ z 0 ) ∈ f , whether w 0 = w, z 0 = z as defined above. The machine first checks to see that w 0 codes an ordinal, and using this ordinal as β it constructs L α and checks to see that L α |= z 0 = z. Lastly, note that L α is correct about this since it has access to all computations on its reals.
On the other hand, we have seen that infinite time effective sets and functions derive many of their properties from the fact that they are absolutely ∆ 1 2 . It is therefore natural to study absolutely ∆ 1 2 reducibility, as we shall do in the last section. One might therefore ask whether there is any sense in which the absolutely ∆ Proof. Let us first show that the desired situation holds under the Maximality Principle, which is the scheme asserting that any forcibly necessary set-theoretic statement is already true (see [Ham] , also [SV] ). A statement is forceably necessary, if it is forceable in such a way that it remains true in all further forcing extensions. If V satisfies the Maximality Principle and ϕ and ψ are Σ 1 2 and Π 1 2 assertions, respectively, which could become inequivalent in a forcing extension
. Since these statements are each absolute to all further extensions of V [G] , this means that the inequivalence of ϕ and ψ is forceably necessary over V and therefore true there by the Maximality Principle. Thus, under the Maximality Principle, any two Σ 1 2 and Π 1 2 assertions that are equivalent in V remain equivalent in all forcing extensions. In particular, every ∆ 1 2 set in V is absolutely ∆ 1 2 . This argument makes use of only a small fragment of the Maximality Principle. And although it is proved in [Ham] that if ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC plus the Maximality Principle, it is also observed there that some models of ZFC have no forcing extensions with the Maximality Principle. Nevertheless, the main argument of [Ham] does show that every model of ZFC has a forcing extension with the Maximality Principle restricted to assertions of a given fixed set-theoretic complexity. Since we only used low projective complexity in the previous paragraph, there is a forcing extension of the universe in which every ∆ 1 2 set is absolutely ∆ • Let x E set y if and only if x and y, thought of as countable sequences of reals, have the same range.
• Let x ∼ = HC y if and only if x and y, thought of as codes for hereditarily countable sets, are isomorphic. (Here, x is said to code a hereditarily countable set z iff, thinking of x as a binary relation on ω, we have (ω, x) ∼ = (tc({z}), ∈).)
• Let x ∼ = y if and only if x and y, thought of as codes for countable structures in a countable language, are isomorphic.
• Let x E λ y if and only if λ x = λ y , that is, if and only if x and y can write the same set of ordinals. Similarly, define x E ζ y if and only if x and y can eventually write the same ordinals, and x E Σ y if and only if x and y can accidentally write the same ordinals.
• Let x ≡ T y if and only if x, y lie in the same classical Turing degree.
• Let x ≡ arith if and only if x, y lie in the same arithmetic degree.
• Let x ≡ hyp if and only if x, y lie in the same hyperarithmetic degree.
• Let x ≡ ∞ y if and only if x and y are infinite time computable from one another (that is, lie in the same infinite time degree).
• Let x ≡ e∞ y if and only if x and y are infinite time eventually computable from one another (that is, lie in the same infinite time eventual degree).
• Let x J y if and only if x, y have equivalent infinite time jumps, i.e., x ▽ ≡ ∞ y ▽ .
Notice that x ∼ = WO y only makes sense for those x, y ∈ 2 ω which code a well order. Thus, this is a relation not on all of Cantor space, but only on the (infinite time decidable) subset consisting of codes for well orders. This issue of an equivalence relation that is merely partial never arises in Borel equivalence relations since the domain of any Borel equivalence relation is a standard Borel space in its own right, and so every Borel equivalence relation can be assumed to be total. We shall allow for the study of infinite time computable relations E ⊂ 2 ω × 2 ω whose domain is defined on an infinite time computable subset of 2 ω .
Some reductions between these equivalence relations are already apparent. For instance, given a countable sequence of reals a n , it is not difficult to construct an HC-code for the set {a n }, and hence E set is computably reducible to ∼ = HC . Next, ∼ = WO is computably reducible to ∼ = HC since it is just the restriction of this relation to the set WO of codes for well orders. Thirdly, it is easy to see that the function x → x ▽ is an eventual reduction from J to ≡ ∞ . Many more details of the interrelationships (with respect to infinite time computable and infinite time eventually computable reducibility) shall be examined as the exposition unfolds.
ENUMERABLE EQUIVALENCE RELATIONS
The classical Borel equivalence relation theory has placed a major focus on the countable Borel equivalence relations, and the investigation of this natural sub-hierarchy of the hierarchy of all equivalence relations has led to some of the most fruitful work (see for instance [JKL] ). Not only do these relations include many of the most natural examples, but some of most powerful methods in the theory appear to work most effectively with countable relations. The situation is rather reminiscent of the focus in computability theory on the c.e. Turing degrees as a sub-hierarchy of the hierarchy of all Turing degrees.
An equivalence relation E is countable if every E-equivalence class is countable. A key characterization of the countable Borel equivalence relations is that they are exactly those relations E with a Borel enumeration, a Borel function f such that f (x) = x 0 , x 1 , . . . effectively enumerates the elements of [x] E . (This is a consequence of the Lusin-Novikov theorem, [Kec, Theorem 18.10] .) The natural extension of the class of countable Borel equivalence relations to the infinite time computable context simply generalizes this enumerability concept.
Definition.
• A countable equivalence relation E is infinite time enumerable if it admits an infinite time computable enumeration function, that is, a function f for which
• Similarly, E is infinite time eventually enumerable if it admits an infinite time eventually computable enumeration function.
Recall that if Γ is any group of bijections of 2 ω , we can define the corresponding orbit equivalence relation E Γ by x E Γ y ⇐⇒ Γx = Γy.
By a theorem of Feldman and Moore [FM] , E is a countable Borel equivalence relation if and only if there exists a countable group Γ of Borel bijections of 2 ω such that E = E Γ . Our first observation is that the infinite time enumerable relations enjoy an analogous property.
Theorem. An equivalence relation E is infinite time enumerable if and only if there exists a countable group Γ of infinite time computable bijections of 2 ω such that E is precisely the induced orbit equivalence relation E Γ . The analogous result holds for the infinite time eventually enumerable equivalence relations.
Proof. Suppose first that there exists such a group Γ. Write Γ = γ n , and let r be a real code for a sequence r n such that each r n codes a program which computes the function γ n . We claim that E Γ is infinite time enumerable in the real r. Indeed, on input x, a program can simply use r to simulate each γ n on input x, and collect the values γ n (x) into a sequence.
Conversely, suppose that E is infinite time enumerable. By the proof of the classical Feldman-Moore theorem, it suffices to establish the conclusion of the Lusin-Novikov theorem, namely:
• E can be expressed as a countable union of graphs of infinite time computable partial functions.
For this, let f be an infinite time computable function which witnesses that E is infinite time enumerable, i.e., for every x ∈ 2 ω , f (x) is a code for the E-class of x. Letting f n (x) denote the n th element of f (x), we have that E = ∪ f n . This completes the proof.
Proposition. The class of infinite time enumerable equivalence relations lies properly between the countable Borel equivalence relations and the countable infinite time decidable equivalence relations.
Proof. That every countable Borel equivalence relation is infinite time enumerable follows from the previous theorem, and it is immediate from the definition that every infinite time enumerable equivalence relation is countable and infinite time decidable. We now give an example of a countable infinite time decidable equivalence relation which is not infinite time enumerable. For each x ∈ 2 ω , we let c x denote the lost melody real relative to x. Recall that c x is a real such that {c x } is (lightface) infinite time decidable in x and yet c x is not infinite time writable in x. It follows that the function f (x) := x ⊕ c x is infinite time semicomputable but not infinite time computable, even from a real parameter. Now, we let x E y if and only if there exists n such that x = f n (y) or y = f n (x). Since f is injective, E is an equivalence relation. Moreover, it is easy to see that E is countable and infinite time decidable. However, E cannot be infinite time enumerable in the parameter z, for then c z would be infinite time writable in z, a contradiction. Indeed, E cannot even be accidentally enumerable.
For an example of an infinite time enumerable equivalence relation which is not Borel, we shall use hyperarithmetic equivalence ≡ hyp . Recall that x ≡ hyp y if and only if x ∈ ∆ 1 1 (y) and y ∈ ∆ 1 1 (x). It follows from the proof of Theorem 2.1 that x ≡ hyp y if and only if x is infinite time computable from y in fewer than ω y 1,ck steps and y is infinite time computable from x in fewer than ω x 1,ck steps. (Recall that ω y 1 denotes the supremum of the ordinals computable in the ordinary sense from y.)
Since ω x 1,ck is infinite time computable from x, the equivalence relation ≡ hyp is clearly infinite time enumerable. But suppose, towards a contradiction, that ≡ hyp is Borel. Then since ≡ hyp is also countable, there exists a Borel function f such that for all x, f (x) codes [x] ≡ hyp . By Theorem 2.1, there exists a program e in a parameter z and an ordinal α such that on any input x, e computes f (x) in fewer than α steps. Replacing z with a more complicated real if necessary, we may suppose that α ≤ ω z 1,ck . Now, using e it is easy to write a program which first enumerates [z] ≡ hyp , then diagonalizes against this set to write a real r = z ⊕ d such that r ∈ [z] ≡ hyp . Since z is quickly writeable from r, we must have that r isn't writable from z in fewer than ω z 1,ck steps. This is a contradiction, because we have just described a program which does so.
The infinite time eventually enumerable equivalence relations are easily seen to be infinite time semidecidable, but as the next proposition shows, not necessarily infinite time enumerable or even infinite time decidable.
Proposition. ≡ ∞ is infinite time eventually enumerable but not infinite time decidable.
Proof. That ≡ ∞ is infinite time semidecidable is shown in [HL2, Theorem 5.7] ; the argument is very simple. On input x, y, just simulate all programs on input x and see if any of them writes y, and vice versa. Now, suppose towards a contradiction that ≡ ∞ is infinite time decidable in the real parameter z. We shall use this to decide the halting problem in z, i.e. the real z ▽ = {e : ϕ z e (0) halts}. Consider the program which attempts to compute this set. It runs all programs simultaneously on input 0, and each time one halts, its output is added to an accumulating set x. Additionally, it checks at each stage whether x ⊕ z ≡ ∞ z and halts if this does not hold.
Note that this program halts, since after some stage all programs which halt have halted. Moreover, at this moment the approximation is correct and so certainly x ⊕ z ≡ ∞ z. It may halt earlier than this, but it must halt with some real x such that x ⊕ z ≡ ∞ z. Hence from z it has computed a real strictly more complex than z, a contradiction.
In particular, we have the following consequence. 4.5. Corollary. The relation ≡ ∞ doesn't computably reduce to any infinite time decidable equivalence relation.
Proposition. The relation ≡ e∞ is infinite time eventually decidable but not infinite time eventually enumerable.
That the infinite time eventual degree relation ≡ e∞ is infinite time eventually decidable is due to Philip Welch. This result was very surprising to experts in the area, since the corresponding infinite time Turing degree relation ≡ ∞ was known not be be infinite time decidable in [HL2] by the elementary argument above.
Proof. First, to see that the set of infinite time eventually writable reals is not infinite time eventually enumerable, suppose that e is a program with oracle z which on input x, eventually writes a code for the ≡ e∞ -class of x. Then consider the diagonalization program q which simulates e on z, and at each stage of simulation writes a real which is not in the set coded on the output tape of e. Then q eventually writes a real which is not in the ≡ e∞ -class of z, a contradiction. Now, to show that ≡ e∞ is infinite time eventually decidable, we shall actually just show that the set of infinite time eventually writable reals is infinite time eventually decidable. The proposition follows, since this argument relativizes to show that given z, the set of reals infinite time eventually writable in z is infinite time eventually decidable. Following the infinite time Turing machine literature, we denote by λ the supremum of the writable ordinals (which is the same as the supremum of the clockable ordinals), by ζ the supremum of the infinite time eventually writable ordinals and by Σ the supremum of the infinite time accidentally writable ordinals. Results in [HL2] establish that λ < ζ < Σ, and Philip Welch ([Wel2] , [Wel1] , see also [HL1, Theorem 1.1]) has proved moreover that
, and furthermore these ordinals are characterized as least having this property. This key result is now known as the λ-ζ-Σ theorem. Welch proved that every infinite time Turing machine computation either halts in time before λ or repeats its stage ζ configuration at Σ. Any computation that eventually stabilizes, reaches its stabilizing configuration before ζ, and the universal computation simulating all programs on trivial input repeats the stage ζ configuration at stage Σ for the first time. Because of this, it is infinite time decidable whether a given real codes the ordinal Σ, since the machine need merely check that it does indeed code a well order, and that the universal computation, when simulated for that many steps, exhibits this repeating phenomenon exactly at that stage. These facts relativize easily to a real parameter. Now, on input x, we can eventually decide whether it is infinite time eventually writable by the following algorithm. First, write a preliminary default "No" on the output tape. Next, simulate the universal computation, and search to see if x is ever shown to be accidentally writable. If so, change the answer on the output tape provisionally to "Yes," and then run the universal program with parameter x to see if there is an x-writable real coding the ordinal Σ. By the remarks in the previous paragraph, any instance of this is infinite time decidable. If Σ is ever found to be x-writable, then change the answer finally back to "No" and halt; otherwise, keep searching.
Let's argue that this algorithm works. If x is eventually writable, then it will appear on the tape before stage ζ, and so we shall pass the first hurdle, where the answer was countable decidable eventually enumerable enumerable countable eventually decidable FIGURE 1. The relationships between various classes of countable equivalence relations. changed provisionally to "Yes." But since x is eventually writable, it follows that Σ cannot be x-writable, since if it were, then Σ would be accidentally writable, contradicting the fact that is larger than all accidentally writable ordinals. Thus, in this case we shall never pass the second hurdle, and so our final answer will stabilize on "Yes," as desired. If x is not eventually writable and also not accidentally writable, then the algorithm will never pass the first hurdle, and so the algorithm will stabilize on the first "No," as desired. Finally, if x is accidentally writable, but not eventually writable, then x appears accidentally on the universal computation, but not before time ζ (since otherwise it would be eventually writable). So it appears at some point between ζ and Σ. In this case, the ordinal ζ is below the supremum of the x-clockable ordinals, and since the supremum of the x-clockable and x-writable ordinals is the same, it follows that ζ is x-writable. From this, it follows that there are ordinals above Σ that are x-clockable, since with oracle x we can run the universal computation, look exactly at the stage ζ configuration, and then wait until stage Σ, when this configuration first repeats. Thus, Σ is also x-writable, and so the algorithm will pass the final hurdle, changing the answer to "No," and halting, as desired.
The relationships between various classes of countable equivalence relations are shown in Figure 1 . Each of the inclusions is proper; we have only omitted the fact that there exists an infinite time eventually enumerable, infinite time decidable equivalence relation which is not infinite time enumerable.
We now turn towards an analysis of the structure of the infinite time enumerable equivalence relations. We begin by describing the most basic structure theory of the countable Borel equivalence relations. First, we have already seen that it is a consequence of Silver's theorem that the equality relation = is the minimum countable Borel equivalence relation. The relations E which are Borel reducible to = are called smooth. By the Glimm-Effros dichotomy (Theorem 3.3), E 0 is the next-least countable Borel equivalence relation, in the strong sense that E 0 is Borel reducible to any nonsmooth Borel equivalence relation. Lastly, and somewhat surprisingly, there exists a universal countable Borel equivalence relation, denoted E ∞ . It is realized as the orbit equivalence relation induced by the left-translation action of the free group F 2 on its power set.
There were initially very few countable Borel equivalence relations known to lie in the interval (E 0 , E ∞ ). It is a fundamental result of Adams and Kechris [AK, Theorem 1] that there exists a sequence {AK α } of continuum many pairwise incomparable countable Borel equivalence relations. In summary, we have that the countable Borel equivalence relations are organized as in Figure 2 .
We would like to develop an analogous picture for the infinite time enumerable relations. We first consider the question of whether the Silver dichotomy holds for the infinite time enumerable relations, that is, whether = is the least complex such relation.
Theorem.
• There is a perfect set of infinite time eventual degrees.
• If E is infinite time eventually enumerable then = ≤ B E.
The proof hinges on the following result. It is nearly implicit in [Wel3] , and Welch has subsequently completed the proof based on that work. We shall shortly provide a different argument which is due to Hamkins.
Theorem (Welch). If c is an L
We remark that our proof of this result will easily relativize. That is, for any real z, if c is an L Σ z [z]-generic Cohen real, then we shall have λ z+c = λ z , ζ z+c = ζ z and Σ z+c = Σ z . Admitting this result, let us show how to complete the proof of Theorem 4.7.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. We begin by arguing that there is a perfect set of eventual degrees. Since L Σ is countable, there exists a perfect set G of reals which are mutually generic over L Σ . It suffices to show that for g,
, in other words g ′ is not infinite time eventually writable from g.
Next, let x ≡ z e∞ y if and only if x and y are infinite time eventually writable from one another using the parameter z. Then by our earlier remarks, Theorem 4.8 relativizes and we in fact have = ≤ B ≡ z e∞ for any z ∈ 2 ω . Clearly, if E is infinite time eventually enumerable in the parameter z then E ⊂ ≡ z e∞ , and it follows that = ≤ e E as well. The result for infinite time computable reducibility can be argued similarly.
It is worth remarking that this argument also gives a reduction (the same function) from = to J. We now return to the proof of Theorem 4.8. Recall the result of Welch we mentioned earlier, that for any z, every computation in z either halts before λ z or repeats the stage ζ z configuration by stage Σ z , and moreover that the universal computation in z repeats for the first time with this pair of ordinals.
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Our strategy will be to show that for any infinite time Turing machine program e, ϕ e (c) repeats from stage ζ to stage Σ. Applying this to the case when e is the universal program, this implies that ζ c = ζ and Σ c = Σ. After this, we shall argue separately that λ c = λ.
The main idea is that instead of carrying out the computation ϕ e (c), which only exists in a world having c, we shall instead carry out a Boolean-valued computation using only the canonical nameċ for the Cohen generic, which is coded by a real in the ground model. The inspiration here is that if c is fully V-generic, then every fact or aspect about the computation ϕ e (c), whether a given cell shows a 0 or 1 at a particular ordinal stage or whether the head is on a particular cell at a particular stage, is forced by some finite piece of the generic real c. This is the magic of forcing. We shall simply design a computation that keeps careful track of this information.
Let us now describe the Boolean computation or simulation of ϕ e (ċ). We embark on a computation that simulates ϕ e (ċ) by computing exactly what information about this computation is forced by which conditions. At each simulated stage of computation, the algorithm keeps track of the values of the cells, the head position and the machine state, not with certainty, but with its corresponding Boolean value. That is, for each cell in the simulated computation, we reserve space in our actual computation to keep track of the conditions p ∈ P that force the current value of this cell to be 0 or to be 1. Similarly, we also keep track of the conditions that force that the head is currently at this cell, and for each state in the program e we keep track of the conditions that force that the simulated machine is currently in that state.
Initially, our simulation data should specify that all conditions force that the head is on the left-most cell and in the start state, and that all the cells on the work and output tapes are 0. For the input tape, which we intend to hold the generic real c, for each cell j we say that a condition p forces that the j th cell has value p(j), if this is defined. Every condition forces that the cells on the scratch and output tapes are all initially 0.
At successor stages of simulation, we can easily update this data so as to carry out the simulated computational step. For example, if p forces that the head is at a certain position, reading a certain value and in a certain state, then we can adjust our data for the next step so that p forces the appropriate values and head position after one step of the program e. There is a subtle tidying-up issue, in that it could happen at a successor step that after this update, although previously a condition q did not force, say, a certain head position, nevertheless now q ⌢ 0 and q ⌢ 1 both force the same head positions (perhaps having arrived from different directions). In this case, we would want to say that q also forces this head position. More generally, if the collection of conditions forcing a particular feature (cell value, head position or state) is dense below a given condition q, then in our update procedure we tidy-up our data to show that q also forces this feature. Let us now explain how to update the data at limit stages of computation. Of course, at any simulated limit stage, we want every condition to force that the head is now on the left-most cell in the limit state. It is somewhat more subtle, however, to update the cells on the tape correctly. The problem is that the data we now have available is the lim sup of the previous data for the cell values, which is is not the same as the data for the lim sup of the cell values. Nevertheless, we will be able to recover the data we need. Note that p forces a particular cell value is 0 at limit time α if and only if there are densely many q below p such that for some β < α, the condition q forces that this cell is 0 from β up to α. But we do have this information available in the lim sup of the previous data, since if q forced the cell was 0 from β up to α, then the limit of this data will continue to show that. Thus, we can correctly compute the correct forcing relation for the cell values on the tape at limit stages of the simulated computation. A simple inductive argument on the length of the computation now establishes that we have correctly calculated the forcing relation for the head position, machine states and cell values at every stage of simulated computation.
If c is actually generic, then this Boolean-valued computation collapses to the actual computation of ϕ e (c) as follows. At every stage α, there are dense sets of conditions p forcing exactly where the head is, and what the state is, and what appears in each particular cell. By genericity, the generic filter will meet each of these dense sets, and so as far as conditions in c are concerned, the ghostly Boolean-valued computation follows along with the actual computation ϕ e (c). Indeed, we claim that if c is merely L Σ -generic (meaning that c meets all predense sets for P coded as elements of L Σ ), then the computation of ϕ e (c) at stage α is exactly what is forced by some condition p ∈ c in the Boolean-valued computation. This is certainly correct at the initial stage, and by induction it is preserved through successor stages and limits, because all the relevant dense sets are in L Σ , and so c meets them as required in order to collapse the Boolean-valued computation.
The key observation now is that since the Boolean-valued computation is repeating from ζ to Σ, it follows that the true computation ϕ e (c) must also be repeating from ζ to Σ. And this is precisely what we had set out to prove. So we have established that ζ c = ζ and Σ c = Σ.
We finally argue that λ c = λ. Suppose that some e had the property that ϕ e (c) halts at some ordinal stage α > λ. Then some condition p forces that ϕ e (c) halts at stage α. We may now run Boolean-valued computation and wait until p forces that halt is achieved. Since the simulated computation takes at least as long as the actual computation, this would allow us to halt beyond λ, a contradiction, since there are no clockable ordinals above λ.
A slew of questions follows. For instance, we have just seen in Theorem 4.7 that there is a perfect set of eventual degrees, and hence of infinite time computable degrees. It is natural to ask just how complex the infinite time Turing degree relations ≡ ∞ and ≡ e∞ actually are. 4.9. Question. Does E 0 reduce (in any reasonable sense) to either ≡ ∞ or ≡ e∞ ?
We have also just seen that a Silver dichotomy holds for infinite time enumerable relations. This leaves open the following related question. 4.10. Question. Does a Glimm-Effros dichotomy hold for the infinite time enumerable equivalence relations? In other words, for any infinite time enumerable equivalence relation E do we have either E ≤ c ∆(2 ω ) or E 0 ≤ c E? (And similarly for infinite time eventually enumerable relations with respect to eventual reducibility.)
We next address the question of whether there is a universal infinite time enumerable equivalence relation. 4.11. Theorem.
• If E is infinite time enumerable, then E ≤ c E ∞ .
• If E is infinite time eventually enumerable then E ≤ e E ∞ . Sketch of proof. This is analogous to the proof that any countable Borel equivalence relation is Borel reducible to E ∞ . In that argument, the key point is that any countable Borel equivalence relation can be expressed as the orbit equivalence relation induced by the Borel action of a countable group. For our result, the key point is Theorem 4.2.
In particular, ≡ ∞ is eventually reducible to E ∞ . It is now natural to extend Question 4.9 to the following stronger statement.
4.12. Question. Does E ∞ reduce (in any sense) to ≡ ∞ ? In other words, is ≡ ∞ universal infinite time eventually enumerable?
Note that Slaman has shown that ≡ arith is universal countable Borel. On the other hand, it us unknown whether ≡ T is universal countable Borel. If it is, then the Martin Conjecture must fail. For a discussion of this question see [Tho] .
Finally, we consider the question of whether there are incomparable infinite time enumerable relations. Indeed, it is not difficult to see from the proof of the Adams-Kechris theorem that there cannot even be a measurable reduction between any two AK α . Hence, we obtain the following result for free. 4.13. Theorem (Adams-Kechris) . There is a sequence {AK α } of continuum many infinite time enumerable equivalence relations which are pairwise infinite time (eventually) computably incomparable.
We conclude this section with a question regarding the following chain of refinements of ≡ ∞ . 4.14. Definition. For α < ω 1 , let x ≡ α y if and only if x and y are infinite time computable from one one another (without parameters) by computations which halt in fewer than α steps. This is an equivalence relation whenever α is additively closed. 4.15. Proposition. Each equivalence relation ≡ α is countable and Borel.
Proof. The main point of interest is that ≡ α are Borel. First note that ≡ α is infinite time computable from an oracle for a real coding α, and it is easily seen that it is infinite time computable uniformly in at most α + α steps. But by Theorem 2.1, any uniformly infinite time decidable set is Borel.
We have the equalities ≡ 0 is ∆(2 ω ) and ≡ ω is E 0 . The union of the ≡ α is again countable, it is precisely ≡ ∞ . Nothing is known about the rest of the ≡ α for α < ω 1 .
4.16. Question. What is the structure of the ≡ α under infinite time computable comparability? Are they linearly ordered with respect to infinite time computable reducibility?
SOME TOOLS FOR SHOWING NON-REDUCIBILITY
In this section we will establish several non-reducibility results, that is, results which state that some equivalence relation E is not reducible to another equivalence relation F. As we have mentioned, many such non-reducibility results from the theory of Borel equivalence relations come from arguments which shows that there cannot be an absolutely ∆ 1 2 reduction from E to F. In this section, we give a survey of some of the non-reducibility results which apply also to ∆ 1 2 reducibility. We begin with a sequence of absoluteness results which will pave the way for forcing arguments later on.
Proposition. If A is an infinite time decidable set, then in any forcing extension there is an unambiguous interpretation of A and moreover it remains an infinite time decidable set.
Proof. If A is infinite time decidable by the program p and the real parameter z, define A of the forcing extension to be the set decided by p and z. To see that this is well-defined, suppose that programs p, q both compute A in the ground model. This is a Π 1 2 fact, and so by Shoenfield's absoluteness theorem, it remains true in the forcing extension.
We remark that the analog of Proposition 5.1 holds for infinite time eventually decidable, infinite time semidecidable and even for absolutely ∆ 1 2 sets. Similarly, we have the following result.
Proposition. If an equivalence relation E is infinite time enumerable, then E is infinite time enumerable in any forcing extension.
Proof. If E is infinite time enumerable, then there exists an infinite time computable f such that f (x) codes [x] E . Hence we have that for all x, y ∈ 2 ω , the relation x E y holds if and only if there exists n ∈ ω such that y = f (x) n . This is a Π 1 2 assertion about the programs computing f and deciding E and hence it is absolute to forcing extensions. 
is Π 1 2 and hence absolute to forcing extensions. We must additionally check that f remains a total function in any extension. Indeed, suppose that the program e eventually computes the function f . Then f is total if and only if for every x ∈ 2 ω and every settled well-ordered sequence of snapshots according with e, the value f (x) eventually appears on the output tape. This demonstrates that the assertion " f is total" is Π 1 2 and hence it is absolute to forcing extensions.
We remark that by Theorem 3.7, Proposition 5.3 fails for infinite time semicomputable reductions f . On the other hand, the conclusion of Proposition 5.3 does hold for absolutely ∆ 1 2 functions. We now introduce several forcing methods for establishing non-reducibility results. Most of the arguments here have been used in the study of Borel equivalence relations, but our adaptations will apply even in the case of infinite time computable reductions. 5.4. Definition. Let E be any equivalence relation. If P is a notion of forcing then a P-name τ is said to be a virtual E-class if the following hold:
We say that E is pinned if it doesn't admit a virtual class.
For instance, E set admits a virtual class via the forcing P = Coll(ω, R) which adds an ω-sequence of reals with finite conditions. Any P-generic sequence will list precisely the collection of ground model reals, and hence any two generics will be E set equivalent. Similarly, it is easily seen that ∼ = WO admits a virtual class via the forcing Q = Coll(ω, ω 1 ).
The key facts, essentially due to Hjorth, are that the countable Borel equivalence relations are pinned (see [KR, Theorem 22] ) and that there cannot be a Borel reduction from a non-pinned equivalence relation to a pinned equivalence relation (see [KR, Lemma 20] Proof. Suppose that E is not pinned, and let P be a notion of forcing with a P-name σ for a virtual class of E. Let g, h be mutually generic for P, so that σ g E σ h holds in V [g, h] . Proof. Suppose that E is not pinned, and let P be a notion of forcing with a P-name σ for a virtual class of E. If f is an eventual reduction from E to F, it is easy to see that a the natural P-name for f applied to σ (let us call it f (σ)) has the property that if G × H is P 2 -generic, then in V[G × H], we have f (σ) G F f (σ) H . Since F is pinned, P forces that f (σ) F y for some ground model real y. Now, by Shoenfield's absoluteness theorem, there exists a ground model real x such that f (x) F y. It follows that P forces that f (σ) F f (x), and hence that σ is E-equivalent to the ground model real x, a contradiction.
Corollary. E set isn't eventually reducible to E ∞ , or even to ≡ e∞ .
But recall that ≡ e∞ is infinite time eventually decidable; it is now unclear just where it should fit into the picture. 5.8. Question. Is ≡ e∞ eventually reducible to ∼ =?
We next turn to cardinality arguments. Some of the relationships between the equivalence relations considered in this paper are summarized in Figure 3 . 
